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COMMENTS
MASTERS AND THEIR FEES
"We cannot all be masters ......
-Othello
The bench and bar of Florida have been called upon by the State Supreme
Court to reexamine the correlation between the administration of justice and
its cost to the individual. Specifically, the fees paid to masters in chancery have
been criticized as imposing an undue burden on those seeking relief in equity.
An understanding of the situation from the proper perspective requires
consideration and explanation of these questions: What is the function of the
master in chancery ? What are his origins, and his right to compensation ? To
what extent is his compensation regulated in the United States? And, finally,
what modifications are required to effect a balance between services and com-
pensation in keeping with the expedient administration of justice ?
1-ISTORICAL DIVELOPMIENT
England
The history of the master being contained in the development of equity
necessitates a brief historical review of the growth of equity.
After the Norman Conquest a dual system of justice was evolved: local
law administered an(l controlled by the nobles, and the national law controlled
by the king.' The resistance of the nobles to centralization in the king was of
no avail.2 Courts were modified to meet the demands of a populace largely
freed from the autocratic control of local nobility.3 Contrary to popular con-
ceptions, the Common Law found its origin not in the general law of the
country arising from deeply rooted custom, but rather in the enforcement of
legal concepts conceived and propounded by special tribunals usually called
the Royal Courts.4 However, the common law courts were not sufficiently
flexible to meet the pressing demands of a. growing society. An alternate
remedy was afforded by direct petition to the king, but soon it became the
I. POTTER, tNTRODUCTION TO TilE Y-IsToRny OF Eovrrv (1931).
2. "It was a most critical period, [Conquest to Edward I] which ended with the su-
premacy of the central government over all forms of local authority, bringing in its train
the superiority of royal over all other kinds of justice." PORTER, INTRODUCTION TO THE
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 9 (2d ed. 1926).
3. 1 REEVES, HIsToRY or TF. ENcGLISH LAW CXXIIT, CXXIV (New Am. ed. 1880).
4. POTEr., HISTORY or EQUITY 1 (1931).
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practice to refer the petitioners to his Chancellor - who then became Keeper
of the King's Conscience."
The boundaries on this development of the Chancellor's power were set
out in the Statute of Westminster the Second, c. 24 (1285), to the effect that
the Chancery would no longer be hound to precedent in the issuance of writs;
it was sufficient if the relief sought and the circumstances of the case were
similar to previous cases.7 In short, principle not precedent became the foun-
dation of the court's jurisdiction.5 Dean Pound, in his Spirit of the Common
Law, identifies this principle with the natural law derived from the Roman
"identification of law with morals.' 1 The Chancellor met with the King's
Council and sat in judgmentt on the petitions praying for justice. As early as
1377 the Chancellor acted independently in dismissing petitions, and by 1474
sat as sole judge in exercising the King's Prerogative. 0
Pollock and Maitland "1 point out that the power to issue writs could
hardly be called judicial, and place the Chancery in the category of a "great
secretarial bureau." 12 It was the function of the principal assistant, whose
title was Master of the Rolls, to supervise the clerks in their preparation of
writs.'3 Because of the impossibility of the Chancellor dealing personally with
innumerable proceedings, the power of the Master of the Rolls was in-
creased. 4 The first delegation of the Chancellor's power occurred during the
term of Cardinal Wolsey (1471-1530).'; Along with the growth of the duties
of the Master of the Rolls there was a corresponding increase in the duties of
the clerks, the more important of whom became known as "masters." "( The
etymology of the ternm "master" involves the consideration that the;v were
ecclesiastics holding deaneries or canonries; . . . they were graduates,
they were 'masters' ..... " IT The term muagistri when applied to the Master int
Chancery seems merely to mark them as men with university degrees.'8 How-
ever, they were further denominated as praeceptores having the power in cer-
tain cases to order the issuance of writs.' 9
After the Reformation the duties of the master were primarily confined
5. POTTRa, A SHORT OUTLINE Op ENGcLISH LEGAL HIsTORY 14 (4th ed. 1945).
6. 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OP ENGLISH LAW 194-195 (2d ed. 1923).
7. Jenks, Edward I, The English Justinian, in 1 SELECT ESSAYS IN A.na.o-A.IERIcAN
LEGAL HISTORY 151 (1907).
8. Ibid.
9. POUND, TIrE SPIRIT OF TiE COMMON LAW 141 (1921).
10. PorTrR, HISTORY OF EQUITY 8 (1931).
11. POLLOCK & MAITLAND, op. cit. supra note 6, at 197.
12. Id. at 193.
13. id. note 1, at 194.
14. RADCLIFFE & CROSS, THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 148 (2d ed. 1946).
15. 1 STORY, COMMNTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE n. 1, 55 (14th ed. Lyon 1918).
16. PLUCKNEr, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 188 (2d ed. 1936).
17. POLLOCK & MAITLAND, op. cit. supra, at 193.
18. Id. note 1. at 194.
19. Ibid.
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to hearings and making reports."' The force and frequency of these reports
attained such proportions that Chancellor Bacon (1561-1626) was finally
constrained to restrict delegation and retained the power of final decision. 2' 1
From the seventeenth century on, the chancery court was sobjected to
much criticism for its delays and expensive litigation. England recognized the
importance of the master's position as an integral part of the court's machinery.
Nevertheless, the system for the master's appointment and fees was steeped in
collusion and chicanery.
During the period from the Restoration to the early part of the seven-
teenth century the price of purchase of a Mastership rose to £5,000, and
evidence was given against I\acclesfield (1725) that Master Elde, being
very anxious to obtain the post, had actually carried 5,000 guineas round to
his house in a basket that there should be no delay. After the impeachment of
Macclesfield, Masterships were no longer sold but the' remained a valuable
form of patronage, and the office was not invariably filled by a competent
official. Incompetence did nothing to shorten proceedings, ajid the large num-
ber of deputies to Masters, Registrars, and Clerks not only caused dilatori-
ness. but added greatly to the expense of the proceedings, since these of-
ficials were largely remunerated from fees taken for such things as docu-
ments at least theoretically drawn up under their supervision and not a few
of which were really unnecessary. '2
Reforms were effected in 1837 under the provisions of 7 WV. 4 and 1 Vict. c.
30 23 which fixed the salaries of masters and forbade their acting as attorneys,
except in certain cases. Further reforms were effected in the Judicature Acts 24
when the Court of Chancery. the common law courts. and certain other courts
were incorl)orated into the Supreme Court of Judicature.
The origins, defects, and reforms contained in this survey, developed and
existed through the middle of the 19th century. At the time of colonization of
America, substantive equity principles having attained a degree of fixity were
transmitted to the colonies. There they were adapted to the frontier society and
equity evolved its own system of procedure.
America
Colonial adoption of the Common L-w (including equity) is still the
subject of controversy. Chancery procedures were not particularly welcomed
by the Puritans for two reasons: the very idea of equiity ran counter to Puritan
individualism and concept of free will as applied in accordance with the judges'
20. POTTER, HISTORY OF EQUITY 15 (1931).
21. ". . . references to the masters were restricted in the reign of King James, when
the masters were no longer allowed to hear and determine, but only to report .. " CRABS, A
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 548 (ist Am. ed. 1831).
22. POTTER, HISTORY OF EQUITY 19 (1931).
23. 1 CHirv, PRACTICE OF Ql'FEN'S RE xCl 11 (Archbold's ed. 1847).
24. SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE ACT, 36 & 37 Vic-r. c. 66, and 38 & 39 VtcT. c.
77 (1875).
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personal standard and the fact that equity courts would have been expen-
sive.2 1 In spite of this opposition some forn of chancery existed in all of the
thirteen colonies prior to the Revolution.'2 ]7 Ii sone colonies, it was the royal
governor who. with the council, sat as an equity court.24 In others. equity
jurisdiction was in the legislature, 2  and several colonies provided for equity
sittings of the comalmOn law court.3 0 During the Revolution, the states made
constitutional provisions replacing royal governors with the state governors
as chancellors, or extending the jurisdiction of the existing courts. A survey
of the constitutions : ' existing before 1789 reveals: constitutions of New
]-lanipshire in 1776 and 1783 continued equity jurisdiction in the superior
court; Massachusetts' constitntion of 1780 and acts of 1782 seemed to coin-
bine law and equity; tle other New England states followed the lead of tile
Bay State, with Connecticut extending equity powers to the superior court.
New York under the constitution of 1777 and acts passed in 1778 continued
the provincial courts but set up a court of errors having equity jurisdiction.
New Jersey and South Carolina made the governor, and vice-president of the
state, respectively, chancellors with South Carolina, providing, in addition,
for three chancellors chosen by the state legislature. Pennsylvania made no
provision in her constitution of 1776 for equity except for limited purposes.
Delaware and Maryland maintained and expanded their courts of equity. Un-
der the Virginia constitution of 1776 an act providing for a high court of
chancery was approved in 1777. North Carolina in 1777 provided that all
civil actions were to be brought in the six districts of the superior court,
Georgia establishing virtually the same judicial systen.
The history of equity courts in this period makes little mention of uras-
ters,3 2 and their existence is a matter for conjecture. One reason for this lack
of reported cases was the dearth of trained magistrates and their failure to
deliver written opinions.aa Another reason iiay have been the adaption of
25. POUND, SPIRIT OF TI CoMmoN LAW 53 (1921).
26. CIlAFRE & SIMPSON, CASES ON EQUITY 9 (2d ed, 1946).
27. Wilson, Coterts of Chancery in the American Colonics, 18 Am. L. REV. 226 (t884),
reprinted in 2 SaLrct ESSAYS I AsaiLo-AMERICAn LEGAL HI.STORY 779 (1908).
28. They were New York, Virginia, New Jersey, Maryland, South Carolina and
Georgia. POUND, ORGANItZATION OF COURTS 76-77 (1940).
29. Id. at 77.
30. ld. at 76.
31. td. at 92 et scq.
32. The Colonial Lawus of New, York give the information that masters were probably
included in the Court of Chancery, "And that the Governour may Depute or nominate in
his stead a Chancellour, and be assisted with such other persons, as shall by him bee
thought fitt and Convenient. Together with all necessary Clerkes and other officers as to
the said Court are needful." 1 COLONIAL LAWS Or NEW YORK 128, c. 7, passed November
1, 1683 (Statutory Revision Committee 1894). Another reference in the same set reveals,
"... Plaintiff in such Suit shall pay to the Defendant ...his . . .full Costs to be taxed
by a Master .... " 5 COroxIAL LAWS OF NEw YoRK 542, c. 1610, passed March 8, 1773.
The conclusion may thus be reached 'that where equity courts were established masters
were an integral part of the court administration.
33. POUxD, SIRIT OF TIlE COMMON LAW t13 (1921).
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equity court proceedings to the particular circumstances of the earlier American
scene rather than the complete incorporation of all the formal trappings of the
English courts.
The later development of United States courts, federal and state, has pro-
vided three lines of treatment :34 the first permits a separate court for equity;
second, and this is the Florida judicial organization, has equity and law in
the same court but following different procedure and on different sides of the
court; and third, the code states which provide for the same procedure and
the same court for law and equity.
FEES
From the earliest development of the office of master in chancery it was
recognized that the master, as an officer of the court, earned his living through
the fees paid him in the performance of his duties. 35 Later development led to
reforms in England 36 and, in some of the states of the union, to the abolition
of appointive masters and the creation of a salaried officer who would not be
dependent on the services performed for his livelihood, 7 At the same time the
master was becoming an established tradition in the chancery courts, it was
recognized that for a particular problem a special master could be appointed
by the chancellor to render the same services as a general or regular master in
chancery. Both general and special masters are sometimes called "masters," 3s
other times "'commissioners," 3, "referees," 40 or "auditors." -I They are
regulated by statute in every jurisdiction, but dispute often arises as to the
amount earned for services performed.
34. For a discussion of the divisions set forth see CLARK, HANDBOOK OF TLE I.AW
OF CODE PLEADING 23 et seq. (2d ed. 1947).
35. The following is a private act passed in 13 Charles 2 for increasing the fees
of Masters in Chancery:
Whereas the office of the master of the Chancery in ordinary is of very ancient
institution, and of necessary use, and continual attendance for the dispatch of the
business depending in that court; it appearing by ancient records that the constitution
of that court was long before the conquest, much of the duty, pains, and attendance
whereof lieth on the said masters. And for that it conduceth much to the due adminis-
tration of justice, that those who exercise places of trust should have competent and
certain rewards suitable to their pains and labour, whereby they may' in due manner
support the quality of their places; and that it is but fitting and necessary for the subject
to allow a moderate payment, where they receive a proportional advantage (a fee of
fower pence in times of that antiquity being as much in value as two shillings now) by
reason whereof in process of time, and the improved rate of all necessaries, the present
recompense of those ancient offices is no way competent and proportionable to their
pains and attendance, which are likewise very much increased without any increase
hitherto of what was sot anciently allowed as aforesaid . 1." I MADDOCK, A TREATISE
ON THE PRINCIPLES AND PRAcT CE OF' TIY HTcH COURT OF CHANCERY note 3, 2 (2d
Am,. ed. 1822).
36. See note 23 supra.
37. POTTER, HlisroY OF EQuITY 15 (1931).
38. FLA. STAT. § 62.06 (1941).
39. Micn. CoMe. LAws §§ 602.96, 602.108 (1948).
40. N. 11. REv. LAWs, c. 395, § 9 (1942).
41. GA. CoDE ANN., § 10-101 (1936).
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Statutory Control
In practically every state in the union the statutory control over the pay-
ment of masters falls into one of the following categories. One, strict control
through specified fees. Twc'o, control by judicial discretion. It should be noted
that these classifications, in practice, are not always clear cut and are some-
times accompanied by unique innovations.
(a) Strict Control
A number of jurisdictions are careful to enumerate the fees of the master
for every eventuality and create a situation where the local court cannot, or
will not, overcome the rigid limitations established by the legislature.
Michigan, as early as 1850, found it necessary to establish a peremptory
system of fees which also prohibited the appointment of masters in chancery,
42
as such, and substituted in their place an elected commissioner. 43 The com-
missioner is precluded from fulfilling any judicial functions and is restricted to
ministerial responsibilities.4 4 In addition, an inflexible table of fees was set up
which specifically provided against the payment for services not enumerated. 45
Thus, the state has circumvented the placing of any discretion in the court.
This is the most drastic solution to the master-fee problem now offered in the
United States, if it may be called a solution at all. It is more in the nature of
circumvention, as it reduces the duties of the master rather than provides for
a just, understandable, and consistent method of compensation.
Some state courts, although furnished with statutory enactments setting
out the exact compensation of masters, have found it advisable to ameliorate
the provisions by increasing compensation where extraordinary work is per-
formed. Kentucky is one of these jurisdictions." Illinois, which has met
with a great deal of difficulty in dealing with the general problem of masters,
now has a statute which reads: "Masters in chancery shall receive for their
services such compensation as shall be allowed by law ... " 47 and then proceeds
to set out a comprehensive schedule. 45 The court has discretion to increase
fees, but requires submission of a report stating work performed and time
spent.49 In no event will the court allow per diem compensation of the master
42. MICn CONST. Art. VI, § 5; Mich. COMP. LAws § 649.1 (1948).
43. Mi n. CoMP. LAWS §§ 602.96, 602.108 (1948).
44. Foster v. Ingham, 128 Mich. 377, 87 N. W. 258 (1901) (where the court refused
to allow compensation for folios on the ground that they were unnecessary and their
preparation was judicial in nature and, therefore, not within the statute).
45. Micri. Comp. LAws § 649.1 (1948).
46. Ky. RKv. STAT., c. 64.260 (1), (2) (1948) ; Fidelity Oil Corp. v. Southern
Oil & Pipe Line Co., 197 Ky. 676, 247 S. W. 950 (1923) ; see Nants v. Doherty, 203 Ky.
596, 262 S. W. 979 (1924) (where court applies statute very strictly requiring statement
of number of days commissioner acted on reference as required by statute).
47. ILL. STAT. ANN., c. 90, § 9 (1934).
48. Id. c. 53, § 38.
49. Norton v. Jordan. 360 TH1. 419, 196 N. E. 475 (1935) (flat $200 charge without
itemizing the time, held, not allowed).
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to exceed that of a chancellor.?" Reports of the masters are carefully scrutinized
and the court apl)lies an objective standard as to how long the work should
have taken.'
Missouri has an odd combination of discretion and limitation. A ceiling
of $10 a day is enforced, up to which amount the court shall provide "fair and
just compensation." 52 Obviously where the prerogative of the court is so re-
stricted, none in reality exists. Ten dollars per diem, in view of the present pur-
chasing value of money and the standard of living, in most cases is inadequate.
The obvious effect is to make it onerous and prohibitive for the more capable
and efficient members of the bar to act as, aides to the court.
Most states which have specified fees attempt to alleviate the severity of
that legislation bw statutory permission for setting of fees by agreement be-
tween parties. Alabam1a,43 Alaska, 4 California, r' (Jeorgia, -" Idaho,5 7 Mon-
tana, 5 North l)akota,"1'  Rhode Island."' South Carolina," and Utah , -" fall
50. Klekamp v. Klekamp, 275 Ill. 98, 113 N. E. 852 (1916) (in this leading case it
was said that the per diem fees must not exceed that of the chancellor; here $35 held
excessive) ; e.g., Kerner v. Peterson, 368 Ill. 59, 12 N. E. 2d 884 (1937) (where $80 per
day was held excessive) ; Rasch v. Rasch, 278 Ill, 261, 115 N. E. 871 (1917) ; Herpich
v. Williams, 300 111. 540, 133 N. F. 220 (1921) (fees should not be so excessive as to
render nugatory the restrictions on per diem allowance) ; City National Bank & Trust
Co. of Chicago v. Sewell, 300 Ill. App. 582, 21 N. E.2d 810 (1939) (applying Kerner v.
Peterson, supra and citing quote which relies on Klekamp v. Klekanp, supra).
51. Bentley v. Ross, 250 II1. 182, 95 N. E. 182 (1911) (in order to get fees over
and above statutory limit, master 'must present his claim; otherwise statute will he
applied to testimony taken) ; Keupner v. Mette's Unknown Heirs, 239 I1. 586, 88 N. E.
218 (1909) ($200 for short report, not involving questions of law, held. excessive);
Wirzbicky v. Dranicki, 235 Ill. 106, 85 N. E. 396 (1908) (requiring properly itemized
report, otherwise illegal and excessive); Gottschalk v. Noyes, 225 Ill. 94, 80 N. E. 72
(1907) (where court decided that master took too long to do the job which included
the preparation of a report, examination of testimony, and hearing objections). But cf.
Lingle v. Bulfer, 322 II1. 606, 153 N. E. 589 (1926); Healey v. Protection Mut. Fire
Ins. Co., 213 Ill. 99, 72 N. E. 678 (1904) (report improper where not sufficiently detailed).
52. Mo. STAT. ANNT. §§ 996. 1231, (1931).
53. ALA. CODE, tit. 7 § 268 (1940).
54. ALASKA COMp. LAWS, vol. II, CODE CIV. Pane. § 55-11-61 (1949) (provides
$4 limit per day except on agreement of the parties in writing to any other rate of
compensation).
55. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC., tit. 14, c. 6, § 1023 (Deering, 1941). Typical of the proviso
is California's, "The fees of referees are five dollars to each for every day spent in
the business of the reference; but the parties may agree, in writing, upon any other
rate of compensation, and thereupon such rates shall be allowed,"
56. GA. CODE ANN. § 10-502 (1936) (where the parties agree upon the person to he
appointed as auditor, then the court will appoint that person and, with the consent of the
parties, fix the auditor's fees in advance incorporating it in the order of appointment).
Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. Central Trust Co. of N. Y.. 135 Ga, 472, 69 S. F. 708 (1910)
(by stipulation of the parties, with the permission of the court, an excess over the statutory
amount is allowable as fees).
57. InAO Cona ANN.. c. 12, § 108 (1948).
58. MO.NT. R v. CoD § 9793 (1935).
59. N. D. Comp. LAws § 3528, para. 4 (1913).
60. R. I. GF.N. LAws AN,',., c. 532, § 4 (1938). (The statute enacted in Rhode Island
requires, on petition of the parties for a reference, that they have made arrangements
to defray the expenses of the reference. Presumably this includes the cost of the mastsr
or special master appointed to carry out the reference.)
61. S. C. CoDE § 4941 (1932).
62. UrAH ConF §§ 104-44-10, (1943).
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generally within this group. South Carolina is in some degree illustrative of
the shift from rigid fees to alleviation by consent. Originally she adhered to
her schedule,0 Later the legislature unbent somewhat by permitting the
parties to add to the custoniary three dollars per diem compensation. 64 But
the court has not been prone to generosity. This is indicated by decisions dis-
allowing additional compensation when there was an agreement in open court
that the master's fees should be fixed by the judge, but failed to specify that
the statutory schedule should not control.0 5 It has also been held that a $250
fee for taking testimony and reporting it with conclusions of law and fact was
proper because there had been a stipulation.6" Georgia employs this method
to ameliorate an unusual system of control: fees limited by a percentage of the
amount in litigation. 6T The agreement may be incorporated into the order of
appointment."5 North Dakota varies only in that it does not require the agree-
ment to be in writing.0 9
Statutory authorization to set fees by consent has usually been construed
so as to allow reductions as well as additions.70 Theoretically, this plan would
seem to operate fairly well. Since the daily rates of reference are usually so low,
the parties might seek to mitigate the harsh statutory limitations, especially if
the case involves larger sums.
A few states vary from the general pattern only in that they furnish
definite fees by reference to other statutes. Colorado has a partial schedule and
then calls attention to the fees received by the sheriffs and justices of the
peace. 71 Ohio 72 and Indiana 73 permit the same fees as are paid to other of-
ficers for similar services. Colorado, like Michigan, allows no increase under
any circumstances. Indiana, when there exists no statutory fee, combines this
system with discretion in the court, limited by the standard of "just and
reasonable." 74
(b) Control by Judicial Discretion
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure T7 and in many states adopt-
ing this system as pertains to masters,7 the fee of the master is left entirely to
63. Guignard v. Harley, 11 Rich. Eq. 1 (S.C. 1859).
64. See note 61 supra.
65. Steward & Kernaghan Inc. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md., 169 S. C. 516,
169 S. E. 434 (1933).
66. Standard Oil Co. of N. J. v. Powell Paving and Construction Co., 139 S. C. 411,
138 S. E. 184 (1927).
67, GA. CODE ANN. § 10-501 (1947).
68. See note 56 spra.
69. See note 59 supra.
70. ALA. CoDE, tit. 7, § 268 (1940) (provides '... a larger or less sum per day.
71. Coo. Come. LAWS, C. 158, § 7892 sec. 26 (1921).
72. OHTO GYN. Coiw ANN. § 11492 (Page, 1946).
73. IND. STAT. AN-.. tit. 4, §§ 3406, 3407 (1933).
74. Ibid.
75. FED. R, Civ. P. 53(a).
76, ARMz. Con., c. 21, § 1101 (1939) Urn.. REV. CODE § 4383 (1935); DisT. COL.
CODE § 16-1715 (1940) ; IowA CODE, c, 624, Rule 208 1946) ; Vr.. Rvx. STAT., C. 95, § 8
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the discretion of the judge. The method presently used in exercising the judicial
prerogative was first outlined in Finance Committee of Pennsylvania v. War-
ren.7 7 In that cause a master was appointed to sell a railroad under a fore-
closure of a trust deed. The railroad was heavily indebted and the amount bid
and approved by the bondholders to protect their investment was $250,000.
Evidence was presented by the master as to the preparation of papers, receiving
and stamping of bonds and other services. Submitted was a fee bill of $5,000
which was appealed. Judge Jenkins called attention to the trust relationship
existing between the master in chancery and the appointing court.
The court looks to him to execute its decree thoroughly, accurately, and
in full response to the confidence extended to him. His compensation should
be measured accordingly. He should be remunerated for the actual work done,
and the time employed, and the responsibility assumed. The amount of com-
pensation should be fixed with due regard to the magnitude of the interests
involved, and to the responsibility of the position. The amount of such con-
pensation, while it should be reasonable, and perhaps liberal, should not be
exorbitant. Possibly, much ground for complaint would be avoided if the
amount of compensation could be determined by some fixed standard. Yet so
various and dissimilar are the services performed, and the character and ex-
tent of the responsibilities assumed, that it might work injustice to deal with
such matters by any ironclad rule.TS
This statement of the measuring stick of judicial discretion was adopted
by the Supreme Court in 1922 in Newton v. Consolidated Gas Co.,79 and has
since been acknowledged as a definitive statement of the rule for federal
courts.80 Another approach, rejected by the Court, was founded on the re-
(1944); N. M. STAT, C. 19, § 101 (1941) ; N. Y. LAws § 1545 C. P. A. (Thompson,
1939) (also permits limitation of $25 on stipulation of parties) ; ORE. CoMe. LAWS ANN.,
tit. 9, § 923 (1940); TENN. CODE ANN. § 10695 (1934) ; VA. CoDE ANN., tit. 29, § 3482
(1942). The usual procedure is found in West Virginia except that the master must
indicate in writing to the court the compensation he believes he is entitled to receive for
his services. W. VA. CoD A z. § 5825 (1943). The new Rules Governing the Courts of
the State of New Jersey, effective Sept. 15, 1948, are similar to the federal rules and are
designed to restrict references by requiring "extraordinary circumstances" except in the
taking of depositions and in matrimonial causes. Rule 3:53-1. Upon the making of a
reference, the master's fee may be fixed by the parties or paid out of any fund or property
as the court sees fit. Rules of Court, 3:53-2. Divorce proceedings with respect to masters
are about the same. Rules of Court, 3:87-4. Of questionable value is the wording of the
New Jersey statute, now abolished, regulating payment of masters. The test to be applied
was, ". . - the fees for services rendered shall be proportionate as nearly as may be to
the actual value thereof, and shall be regulated by the chancellor from time to time."
N. J. REV. STAT., tit. 2, c. 2, § 12 (1937). A similar test was applied to special masters,
with the further requirement that the state treasury pay the fees on the certificate of the
chancellor. Id. at tit. 2, c. 2, § 14. Special provision is made in divorce proceedings under
a 1941 act which requires the appointment of a maximum of twelve advisory masters
to advise the chancellor. They are to hold office for seven years and receive compensation
fixed by the chancellor and made payable from fees received under rule of court, "...
and shall not engage in the practice of law in any of the courts of this state as counsel
or otherwise." N. J. LAWs 1941, c. 307, § 1, p. 827 approved July 28, 1941.
77. 82 Fed. 525 (C. C. A. 7th 1897).
78. Id. at 527.
79. 259 U. S. 101 (1922).
80. First Trust & Say. Bank v. St. Louis Coke & Iron Co., 29 F.2d 506 (C. C. A.
7th 1928).
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muneration of judicial officers " performing similar functions saying, "... a
higher rate of compensation is generally necessary in order to secure ability
and experience in an exacting and temporary employment which often serious-
Jy interferes with other undertakings." 82 But the Court did compare the high
fees awarded the master and the salaries of the mayor of New York, $15,000
per year, and the governor and justices of the Court of Appeals of New York,
$10,000, and concluded that his fees were decidedly excessive when considered
on this malleable basis.8 3
The decisions of the various circuit courts, before the Newton case and
where the Finance Committee holding was not followed, established the value
of the master's services by resort to the applicable state law ;54 or, the salaries
of judges,85 on the basis that the master was performing a judicial function;
or, on consideration of the special services rendered ;f0 and also, the thorough-
ness of the report rendered and time spent in consultation. T
It may be seen that prior to the Newton case there were a number of foun-
dations on which the various courts of the federal judiciary rested. Subsequent-
ly, the federal courts gave weight to all considerations, ". .. amount involved,
.. responsibility, and the character of the work .... difficulty of it .... skill and
knowledge required, and the compensation paid under like circumstances in
other cases. ."I'll A similar test was utilized in a patent infringement case but
was hedged in by the requirement that the allowance to masters should be kept
within just and reasonable limits in order to avoid unnecessary expense in the
administration of justicefi 9
Effects of the Newton case are illustrated in a corporate foreclosure action
where the consideration involved was $3,000,000 and the value of the property
in excess of $7,000,000 but the transfer was a paper one."" A master's fee of
$16,500 was reduced to $7,500 on the basis of the Newton case and the disbar-
ment proceedings which followed that decision, 1 where the Court had indicated
that caution should be used and, "... vicarious generosity in such a matter
could receive no countenance." 92
However, federal courts have generally not considered themselves confined
81. Middlton v. Bankers & Merchants Tel. Co., 32 Fed. 524 (C. C. E. D. Pa. 1887).
82. 259 U. S. 101, 105 (1922).
83. Id. at 104, 106 (in 282 days the fees awarded the master for eight causes, joined
in this action, totaled $118,000).
84. Doughty v. West, Bradley & Cary Mfg. Co., 7 Fed. Cas. 971, No. 4,030 (C. C.
S. D. N. Y. 1870) (however, the court increased the compensation on a showing of
extra labor by the master, and the inadequacy of $3 per day rate under state statute).
85. Middlton v. Bankers & Merchants Tel. Co., 32 Fed. 524 (C. C. E. D. Pa. 1887).
86. Erie Ry. Co. v. Heath, 8 Fed. Cas. 766, No. 4,516 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1872).
87. Brown v. Pennsylvania R. R., 250 Fed. 513 (C. C. A. 3d 1918).
88. First Trust & Say. Bank v. St. Louis Coke & Iron Co., 29 F.2d 506, 507
(C. C. A. 7th 1928).
89. Van Kannel Revolving Door Co. v. Uhrieh, 297 Fed. 303 (C. C. A. 81 1924).
90. First Trust & Say. Bank, supra.
91. In re Gilbert, 276 U. S. 294 (1928).
92, Id. at 296.
COMMENTS
under the Newton case, since it is inherently subject to wide construction. It
permits a court to he hound only by its own discretion and the possibility of
reversal on review.0 'a Several courts simply state that they are exercising the
discretion they have under the Rules of Civil Procedure or the old Equity
Rules. 9 4 The time spent in the reference and the nature of the report rendered
by the master are often emphasized as reasons for increasing or decreasing
fees. 5 In one case, the fund which the master was called upon to consider was
reduced from $20,000 to $16,000 and the appellate court suggested to the dis-
trict court that it take this matter into consideration and redetermine the mas-
ter's fee.90 External standards were applied in determining the fee in a matter
involving property of a public utility worth in excess of $112,000,000.9 The
amount in dispute was $4,500,000 and was settled by the master after 285 days
on the actual reference and 60 days preparing the report. Expert witnesses
testifiedt as to the worth of the services before the court decided on a fee of
$25,000 based on their testimony)'5 This seems to be a logical way to determine
the fee, but it could deteriorate into a "wager of law" based on who could afford
the best expert.
Statutes of Pennsylvania are indicative of the preference jurisdictions have
for discretion over specific statutory fees.99 Originally Pennsylvania had a strict
schedul. An early decision allowed a greater fee than permitted under the old
statute; the court applied a new law which authorized the courts to give such
additional compensation as they deemed proper.',0 Concerning a master in a
partition suit, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania announced in 1938 that
plaintiff would be bound by the facts in each case ;1"" it was the judge to whom
the services were rendered who could best decide the master's fee; and, "...
only in cases of an abuse of discretion of the court below ... will [this court]
interfere." 102 Pennsylvania's divorce laws are unique, permitting each of the
various courts of common pleas to make its own rules for fees.'9 9
93. Shotkin v. Beidler, 70 F.2d 398 (C. C. A. 3d 1934) (however, appe4l courts
are loath to disturb the discretion of the district courts in the absence of abuse of
discretion).
94. E.g.,Aluminum Colors v. U. S. Research Corp., 17 F. Supp. 261 (E. D. N. Y.
1936) ; Rauer v. Halfield, 295 Fed. 48 (C. C. A. 9th 1924).
95. E.g., Lazar v. Cecelia Co., 30 F. Supp. 769 (S. D. N. Y. 1939) ; Sheldon v. More-
dall Realty Corp., 29 F. Supp. 729 (S. D. N. Y. 1939); Steinfur Patents Corp. v. Meisel-
Galland Co., 27 F. Supp. 737 (E. D. N. Y. 1939) ; Roxana Petroleum Corp. v. Colquitt, 34
F2d 470 (W. D. Tex. 1929); Whittall v. Murray Furniture Co., 41 F.2d 277 (M. D. Pa.
1930) ; Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 26 F. Supp. 134 (S. D. N. Y. 1939),
reild on other grounds, 160 F.2d 45 (C. C. A. 2d 1939).
96. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. American Surety Co. of N. Y., 64 F.2d 577
(C. C. A. 4th 1933).
97. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Railroad Commission of California, 14 F. Supp.
134 (D. C. N. D. Cal. 1936).
98. Ibid.
99. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 17, § 1746 (Purdon, 1930).
100. Krause v. Stiles, 9 Phila. 127, 30 Leg. Int. 216 (1873).
101. Miller v. Kennedy, 200 Atl. 173 (Pa. 1938).
102. Id. at 174.
103. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 23, § 66 (Purdon, 1930); Clark v. Clark, 160 Pa. Super.
562, 52 A.2d 351 (1947).
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Oftentimes the courts are given discretion and then are instructed by
statutory mandate to provide "just and fair compensation" or to be "reasonable"
according to the situation. 104 Basically these jurisdictions conform to the federal
doctrine where there also exists a broad prerogative, confined only by appellate
review.
A further variation from the usual legislation may be found in those juris-
dictions where the court has discretion and the fee is paid either by the county
or the state.'0 5 Vermont has used this procedure ever since 1878 with the re-
stilt that there have been no cases taken ol appeal over a controversy regarding
fees of masters, commissioners, auditors, referees or special masters.
(c) Florida
As early as 1845 the Florida legislature recognized the need for a system
of compensation for masters.' 0 6 Our present law is a modification of that legis-
lation.S0 T It reads as follows:
104. "Reasonable compensation": ARK. STAT., tit. 12, § 1711 (1947); MASS. LAWS
ANN., c. 221, § 55 (1933) ; MIss. CODE § 445 (1930) ; N. C. G.aN. STAT., c. 6, § 7 (1943).
Indiana courts are directed to "... make such allowances for the service performed as
shall be just and reasonable. IND. STAT., tit. 4, § 3406 (1933). Payment shall be in
full, is the admonishment to the Wisconsin courts dealing with the problem of court com-
missioners. Wis. STAT. § 252.15 (3) (1947). There are four states where the courts are
instructed to provide "just and proper" compensation for the master, auditors, commis-
sioners or referees. KAte. GEN. STAT. ANN., c. 60, art. 2928 (1935) NEa. COMP. STAT.,
c. 20, art. 1137 (Dorsey, 1929) ; OKLA. STAT., tit. 12, § 619 (1941) WYO. COMP. STAT.
ANN. § 3-2509 (1945). These statutes are identical. "The referees shall be allowed such
compensation for their services as the court deems just and proper, which shall be taxed
as part of the costs in the case." Prior to the adoption of Rules of Civil Procedure in Texas
(Acts 1939, 46th Leg. p. 201 § 1) that state had authorized the appointment of masters in
chancery. Under Rule 172 it has been held that the allowance of $5,368.30 to an auditor
in connection with original report and suit in accounting of partnership, was not an abuse
of discretion vested in the court by virtue of the "reasonable compensation" standard in
the language of the rule. McGrew v. Britton, 206 S.W.2d 836 (Tex. Ct. Civ. Ap. 1947),
citing Tex. R. Civ. P. 172. In Louisiana, the master is paid at the discretion of the court,
hut the court is required to consider the circumstances of the reference. LA. CODE oF
PRAC., Art. 462.8 (Dart, 1942).
105. Mu. Ruv. STAT,, C. 95, § 8 (1944) (may make county pay the master's fee if
court in its discretion decides it should) ; MIrN. STAT., c. 546.33 (1945), (permits refer-
ence by consent of the parties and provides for payment out of the county treasury where
the order of reference states said reference is required by "press of business") ; c. 357.20
provides a minimum of $5 and a maximum of $25 per day for referees, and also permits
increase by stipulation of the parties with increased payment devolved on them. N. H.
REV. LAws, c. 370, § 21 (1942). (The snperior court is permitted to appoint certain retired
justices as masters with a fixed salary. Where a master is appointed, the court is to allow
a reasonable amount for his services to be paid by the county.) See c. 395, § 15 (with re-
spect to referee, court shall follow same procedure providing reasonable compensation to
be paid by the county). S. D. Cofs. LAwS § 2540 (1929) ; VT. REV. STAT., tit. 49, § 10,
473 (1947) (fees and necessary expense of the referee are fixed by the court and audited
and paid by the county wherein the court is held which made the reference).
106. FLA. LAws, c. 51, § 6 (1845).
107. FLA. LAws, C. 1815, § 1 (1870) ; FLA. RaV. STAT. § 1442 (1892) ; l'i.A. GN.
STAT. § 1894 (1906), FLA. Ru.v. GEN. STAT. § 3150 (1920) ; FLA. CoMp. GEN. LAWS §
4937 (1927) ; F.A. STAT. § 62.07 (1941).
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"The fees of the master shall be as follows :
Attendance on litigated case, per (lay ...................... $2 00
Attendance on unlitigated case, per day .................... $1 00
Attendance to settle litigated report, per day ................ 2 00
Attendance to settle unlitigated report, per day .............. 1 00
Deed or bill of sale, drawing ...................... ....... 4 00
Deed, executing ........... ...................... 1 00
Deposition of witness, taking, per 100 words ............... 25
Exhibits, marking and numbering, each .................... 05
Moneys (except moneys arising from sales),
receiving and paying out, on first
five hundred dollars ....................... 4 per cent
O n residue ............ ...................... Y of 1 per cent
R ecognizance, taking .................................. 50
Report upon appointment of guardian .................... 2 50
Sale, attending and adjourning .... ............. 00
For making, the same fees as are allowed sheriffs.
"'For all other services, the same fees as are prescribed for clerks of the
circuit court. When no such fees are prescribed, then he shall receive such
compensation as the judge may fix. All fees shall be taxed as part of the costs
of the cause." 1""
Florida, then, offers an unique combination of specific fees, specific fees
by reference, and discretion. This scheme would seem to incorporate the best
features of legislative control and judicial prerogative.
Failure to interpret properly the statute has not been the cause of grief
for many judges prior to the 1948 term of the Florida Supreme Court. The
first case considered by the court, Chandler v. Sherman,09 was in 1877. An
action for accounting was referred to a master who spent over one hundred
days in examining the books. He was allowed $500 for his services. The
court decided that it could not hold that the labor charged for had not been
performed and permitted recovery of five dollars per day as not being "...
an extravagant charge for the services of a good, competent and accurate
master and accountant." 110 It recognized a necessary discretion in the trial
judge: "The question as to the actual employment of 100 days in this labor
was before him [judge of the circuit court] and he found as a fact that such
time was necessary to the examination of the books and the statement of the
account." 11 The bench was cautioned, "It is the duty of the judge to be care-
ful that he does not allow for more labor than has properly been performed . t1 2
108. FLA. STAT. § 62.07 (1941).
109. 16 Fla. 99 (1877).
110. Id. at 118.
111. Ibid.
112. Ibid.
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This dicta has been seized upon in other Florida cases as a limitation of discre-
tion.
Master's compensation was not the subject of litigation for a long period
of time. Marion Mortgage Co. v. Moorman 113 was a contest over an award
of $2,500 to a special master based on, so-called, special duties performed by
him. ie prepared a report of disbursements; made several trips to various lo-
calities prior to the sale of the foreclosed property; and accepted moneys from
a receiver. The court in examining the record decided that the labor performed
required no hearings, findings of fact, or conclusions of law, and was not of an
extraordinary nature. 114 The implication, logically following, is that in order
for a master to get a large fee he must do more than fail to come within the
fee schedule established by statute. His function in this case impressed the
court as merely one of sale, receipt, and disbursement of moneys. With respect
to the trips made by the master prior to the sale, the court held that such was
the prformance of useless and unnecessary labor by the master which must
be disregarded in fiking the amount of compensation.11 5 While in the Sherman
case the court would not say that the labor was not performed and permitted
compensation, the court now announced that it would examine the performance
by the master and eliminate from his total fee those charges which indicated un-
necessary work although erroneously performed. The apparent severity of this
ruling might possibly be modified by a showing of honest error.
The third in the series of Florida cases was Mabry v. Knabb. 116 On the re-
manding of the cause, a master was appointed and much testimony was taken
with respect to payment by the lessee, Knabb, of an equitable lien held by the
plaintiff attorneys, Mabry, et al., on lands acquired under a mortgage fore-
closure for Chicago Land Co. A fee of $1,250 was declared by the supreme
court to be excessive and was reduced to $750. "We see no basis in the record
for allowing a special master a larger fee than the statute allows counsel to
litigate the cause." 117 Here the standard adopted by the court was limited by
statutory fees allowed counsel. This decision should be considered a weak and
improper one. First, there is nothing to indicate that the master did anything
other than take testimony the fees for which are specifically enumerated. Second,
the reference to statutory counsel fees is uncalled for by statute 62.07 and is an
unduly narrow construction. In effect, the court adopted a legislative standard
when the legislature did not so intend, and refused to accept responsibility for
efficient judicial administration.
W. & W. Corp. v. Feit 118 is another decision in this line of cases. The
113. 100 Fla. 1522, 131 So. 650 (1930).
114. Id. at 1527, 131 So. at 651.
115. Ibid.
116. 151 Fla. 432, 10 So.2d 330 (1942).
117. Id. at 453, 10 So.2d at 558.
118. 101 Fla. 1091, 134 So. 57 (1931).
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supreme court gave an indication of its attitude towards the trial court's discre-
tion in fixing master's fees. In revising the compensation allowed a receiver
by the circuit court, ". . . ordinarily the court is loath to interfere with a
chancellor's discretion in the allowance of fees to its officers for services effi-
ciently performed .... " 1l0 It would appear that when the services have been
efficiently performed, and there is no applicable enumerated statutory fee,
there will be no reversal unless the record reveals a flagrant abuse of the rights
of one of the parties, or the record does not disclose any basis at all for the
extra compensation.
The case of Cohn v. Cohn 120 was decided in 1948. A master was appointed
in a divorce action and contended that he had heard testimony, conducted many
conferences and, through his efforts, a settlement between the parties over
the property in dispute resulted in an uncontested divorce. Hle then submitted
a bill for $1,000 for services performed which was reduced to $750 by the
chancellor. As the basis for his decision the chancellor enumerated fourteen
points ;i t
1. importance of the case
2. age of the special master
3. ability of the special master
4. experience of the special master
5. wide knowledge of the law
6. responsibility assumed by master
7. quality of work done
8. testimony taken of petition for rehearing
9. purchase power of money
10. financial ability of defendant
11. income of defendant
12. no testimony submitted to effect that allowance for special
master will work financial hardship on defendant
13. large income of defendant, leading physician
14. plaintiff's and defendant's attorneys agreed that the charge
was reasonable.
The supreme court said flatly that the chancellor had failed to be guided by
the statute and cited with approval Koomnan's Florida Chancery Pleading as
containing a fair summarization of the Mabry and Ma rion cases.
Where masters are to hear witnesses, examine and consider evidence,
try and determine controverted questions of fact, investigate and state com-
plicated and controverted accounts, and make reports of the proceedings and
results to the court, it has generally been understood and practiced that they
119. Id. at 1096, 134 So. at 59.
120. 36 So.2d 199 (Fla. 1948) ; 2 MIAMI L. Q. 336, Qua rtcrly Synapsis.
121. Id. at 200.
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should be allowed a reasonable compensation irrespective of schedule of fees,
In such cases the court will allow compensation commensurate with the
master's ability, experience, and fitness for the tasks assigned to him and
commensurate with the importance and difficulty of his work and the respon-
sibility it imposes upon him. But the tendency of the court should be to keep
down these charges instead of adding to the burdensome expense of litigation.
In all ordinary cases of no peculiar or special difficulty, and involving no
extraordinary labor, the master should be allowed no greater compensation
than that fixed by the statute or rule of court.
1 2 2
It should be noted that there was no attempt made to deal with the bases of the
chancellor's decision, because the master had performed counsel's tasks
entirely outside the scope of his reference, bases used to a great extent in other
jurisdictions and accepted as being facts to be considered where the fees are
discretionary with the court. Thus it is still a matter of conjecture whether
the court under a proper set of facts would adopt any of the fourteen points
enumerated.
Rainey v. Raincy 123 presented a situation where an action for divorce
was brought in the Circuit Court of Dade County and a master was assigned
to hear evidence concerning a counter-claim for $3,000. Testimony was taken
and the divorce awarded the defendant. Incorporated in the final decree was an
order for the plaintiff to return the $3,000 and pay the special master a fee of
$1,500. An appeal was carried to the Supreme Court of Florida on that part
of the decision dealing with the return of $3,000 and the special master's fee.
Justice Terrell said in part,
The Special Master's fee in a litigated matter like this is of secondary
importance to the attorney's fee. If the litigant is required to pay one-half
the amount involved in the litigation for a Master's fee, an attorney's fee
in proportion, and costs of courts in addition to all this, he will be required
to resort to other resources to pay for the luxury of having his name connected
with a lawsuit. Such a result is contrary to every canon of noblesse oblige and
will justly shower undue criticism on the administration of justice.12 4
With this view the writer concurs unequivocally. At the same time it must not
be forgotten that the administration of justice demands men of integrity, intelli-
gence, training and patience. Under the fees provided by the statute it is not to
be expected that trained attorneys will be eager to serve the courts. Many of
them will find it a heavy burden to participate in the essential juridical process
of reference. Either the court should have made specific reference to the inade-
quacy of the statute, thus stimulating revision, or it should have recognized that
the proper conduct of judicial administration requires an interpretation which
will encourage participation by the counsellors in each community. No attempt
122. KOOMAN, FLORIDA CHANCERY PLEADING AND PRACTICE 306 (1939).
123. 38 So.2d 60 (Fla. 1948).
124. Id. at 61.
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was made to guide the inferior court in determination or definition of the extra-
ordinary labor doctrine established in the Marion case.
Mr. justice Terrell speaking for the court again in Garlick v. Garlick,12'
objected to the payment of court costs of more than $5,000 including a, master's
fee of $1,000 in what was called, ". . a run of the mill divorce case. .. ." 126
The question of fees involved was not presented to the court for its consideration
but was treated because ". . . it is so obviously out of harmony with justice
and legal proprieties." ]27 Here the court established that the statute relating
to the compensation of masters must be strictly construed unless there is
.proper showing" to permit modification. A "proper showing" requires an
announcement by the master of controverted questions which have been decided
together with a careful report of time spent on the different matters inl the
reference. This seems to establish that the court is in agreement with several
other jurisdictions where the compensation of masters has been hedged in by
statutory provisions and judicial decisions. 2 8 An earlier 1948 per curiaiz deci-
sion 129 otdered the-reduction of the fee of the special master from $2,500 to
$1,200 since it was not sustained by substantial evidence. The last case in which
the problem of master's fees was considered by the highest court in this state
was Cravero v. Dra 130 where the court cited its previous decisions and ordered
a reduction in costs.
It is difficult, if not impossible, to attempt to establish a pattern on the
basis of the reported cases. The only thing that appears to be settled is that
the master is required to perform some acts not enumerated in the schedule to
remove him from its fee restrictions. Vacillation from the distant attitude of
the Chandler case; the careful examination of the master's performance as in
the Marion and Cohn cases; the incongruous standard of attorney's fees in
the Mabry case, alluded to in the Garlick decision; and the "proper showing"
doctrine announced in Garlick v. Garlick, permits for no standard test. Un-
doubtedly, it is more advisable to have a standard subject to criticism than to
have none at all.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Because of the very complexity of our society we are compelled to take
stock of our judicial system and its fulfillment of its mission. The objective
of our system of laws is the speedy administration of justice. This is not a
concept which may be discussed in a social vacuum but is an idea inextricably
intertwined with the pattern of a complex industrial society. Sometimes we
125. 38 So.2d 222 (Fla. 1948).
126. Id. at 223.
127. ibid.
128. See notes 46, 50 supra.
129. Robbins v. Robbins, 36 So.2d 786 (1948).
130. FLA. SUP. CT. March 4, 1949.
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
survey the entire field and demand complete revision. at other times it is
necessary to examine a minute fragment of this province. The collation of
master's fees and the speedy administration of justice is the minute, but impor-
tant, fragment under discussion.
As has been illustrated, the master is regulated by statute and still further
controlled by judicial decision. He is an officer of the court, in most cases
performing judicial functions, and is looked to by the court to expedite judicial
adninistration. His value to the court is demonstrated by his handling of
controverted questions of fact and law which require much time to hear and
deternine. 'he position of master in chancery is one of trust to the court
and to the litigants, both of whom he serves. Often it is the master's report on
which the court relies in formulating its decision.
Few matters are quite as important in a legal contest as is the question
of the cost to the parties. When a person enters into a lawsuit which may
require a reference he is understood to assume the possible burden of paying
for that work. As in so many other fields of the law, the standard is one of
reasonableness according to the exigencies of the situation. The costs of the
mastership may make litigation a burden and prevent the assertion or enforce-
meht of legal rights. What may he considered inexpensive by one party may
very easily be exorbitant to another. Theories of law can not be divorced from
economic realities.
A reference takes the time of an attorney or other person learned in the
law and his efforts must be compensated, if a mastership is not to become a
penalty. Facing the legal "facts of life" it must he conceded that to get capable,
efficient, and competent masters a fair stanidard of compensation should be
announced. In each community the finest lawyers should be attracted to serve
as masters. To fix his fees of reference at a low figure is. in effect, to compel
him to shirk public responsibility. This is not the same as charity cases where
the bar has the duty to see that an individual, who can not afford to pursue his
remedy in the courts, is given legal aid. It is the dqty of the bar to insure that
it serves the public, and a reciprocal duty of the public is to provide fair
remuneration for specialized services. The matter devolves to an attempt to
effect a balance between the adequacy and reasonableness of the master's fees,
and the limitation of expense of litigation to the disputants.
When discretion is in the court, it is essential that an understandable and
easily ascertainable standard of payment lie announced. This avoids confusion
as to the amount, hesitation as to the actual award, and litigation in the appel-
late court. It provides an award for services, fixed by the one for whom the
services have been performed, and who should be best able to appreciate their
value. To he effective it must not sacrifice flexibility for definiteness. Tradi-
tionally, it has been the factor of flexibility that has enabled our judicial
organization to cope with public problems and personal difficulties involved
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in a dynamic industrial community. Appellate review must be exercised with
restraint and firmness and should provide the flexible, but understandable
and ascertainable, standards necessary for orderly judicial administration.
Since the master is an officer of the court it is proper that he be appointed
by the chancellor. This power in the chancellor inheres within it the possibility
of its use as a source of political patronage, especially when it is remembered
that most state judges are elective officers. While the particular problem is not
within the scope of this comment, it is imperative to draw attention to its
existence.
The objectives outlined above provide a basis to test those jurisdictions
which have a strict statutory fee schedule. In Michigan, 13 1 a very strict juris-
diction, it is doubtful that the processes of judicial administration are expedited
under a statute which provides for the election of commissioners to serve the
functions of masters, and restricts them to ministerial responsibility. As previ-
ously pointed out, this approach is definitely inadequate. Expedition is com-
pletely sacrificed as the master no longer exists. Also, it may be observed
that elected ministerial officers are seldom acclaimed for causing the wheels
of justice to grind more rapidly. Its brightest feature is the limitation of costs
which may not be departed from, and which does not allow for payment where
the functions performed by the commissioner are not provided for in the detailed
statute. There is little question to the assertion that the compensation is far
from fair when the normal functions of the master are considered. This does
not work too much hardship in Michigan, the commissioner not being permitted
to decide questions of law. The strictness of the schedule has the beauty of
inexorability and definiteness for those who crave these features.
An objective standard is applied in Illinois and Kentucky 132 to ameliorate
the fee schedule rigidity. By providing supplementary compensation for extra-
ordinary services performed, these courts encourage speedy litigation. In com-
pensating the master the courts examine the services performed and the
payment awarded to see if it is justified under all the circumstances involved.
It seems to be fair to the parties in the requirements that (1) extraordinary
labor be performed; (2) the compernsation awarded the master be in conformity
with the time spent on the reference itself and in deciding questions presented to
him; and, (3) the limitation that the per diem fee not exceed that of the
chancellor. The standard is not difficult to determine and these jurisdictions
provide for flexibility where it is needed the most: in cases requiring excep-
tional labor.
Where the statute provides for discretion up to $10 per day 133 there is
no real discretion. Flexibility is accomplished up to the maximum fee, but this
131. See notes 43, 44, 45 supr.
132. See notes 46, 49 supro,
133. See note 52 siupra.
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is not the concept of flexibility which should be associated with the work of a
master who may be called upon to solve intricate questions of fact and law.
Nor is there fair compensation to the master if the same considerations are
kept in mind. An easy measure of fees is set by the monetary limitation and
serves to keep the costs of litigation to a minimum.
The parties may stipulate in certain states, such as South Carolina 1" and
California,'3 5 to ease the restrictiveness of the statutory fees. When the parties
do stipulate, the process of administration is accelerated. By the stipulation,
however, the parties must agree to sacrifice the limitations of fees under the
statute to speed the decision in their cause. This might not operate too well for
the penurious litigant seeking a speedy disposition of his grievance. The basic
weakness is that the compensation might only be equitable in those situations
where the parties agree to the stipulation. No standard is easier than that
established by the parties or definitely enumerated in the laws of the state.
Nowhere is flexibility present if the parties are too poor to pay an extra fee to
the master, or do not wish to do so.
Georgia,136 in setting a high enough ceiling on the payment to auditors,
probably avoids strictures on the speedy hearing and deciding of causes by
reference. The cost to the parties is limited to $1,000 under the percentile
system. This is indeed a strange way to decide fees; who can say that the
questions to be decided in a case involving $500 are not more knotty than those
involved in litigation where the amount in controversy is ten times that sum ?
In most situations the fee limit would provide fair compensation to the master.
Situations calling for exceptional ability and lengthy reference are not covered
and reveal the weakness in an inflexible limitation on payment to master. A
perusal of the statute discloses an exact standard to be followed in determining
the auditor's remnneration-a guide to the judge, the attorney and the client.
Generally then, strict jurisdictions are able to maintain costs at a reasonably
low level and to create an easy self-operating standard of compensation. Sacri-
ficed to low-cost litigation and easy standards are flexibility and fair
compensation to masters. The result of the conjunction of these facts is that
the system tends to defeat itself. Inadequate and unfair fees breed inefficiency
and dilatory handling of complex legal matters tinder reference.
Federal courts have the widest possible latitude in determining the compen-
sation of masters. The rule allows the district court judge to set the recompense
of the master at his discretion, permitting fair, remuneration where exceptional
services for the court have been performed. At all times this basis confers a
high degree of flexibility subject only to possible restriction in the appellate
court's interpretation of the worth of the services performed. These two factors
134. See note 61 supra.
135. See note 55 sitpra.
136. Sce note 67 supra.
COMMENTS
combine to give expeditious handling of judicial matters too complex for the
courts to handle without preliminary investigation and tentative determination
by the master. But the solution is not complete. Parties to the litigation can
rarely tell in advance what the fee bill will be. There is very little chance of
predetermination by comparison, since each fee case seems to be decided on
its particular merits. What then is the standard to be utilized in fathoming fees?
There is a harrier of words of limitless extent; words which serve to declaim
rather than explain or announce fee standards. Words such as "work done,"
"time employed," "responsibility assumed" might guide an attorney, while
others confuse with "reasonable," "liberal," and "not exorbitant." At one time
federal courts did not try to use judicial salaries in instituting a comparison,
but this criterion has now been abandoned for the "all factors are to be consid-
ered" elusive pattern.
Complete contentment can not be found tinder the federal doctrine or the
strict (and modified strict) jurisdictions. The federal doctrine satisfies the
requirements of expeditious handling of judicial affairs, and asserts flexibility
to permit fair reward to the master for his efforts, while losing any hope of a
definite standard. Courts which apply the strict doctrine accomplish reasonable
cost of litigation and lose flexibility and speedy disposition of causes. Combin-
ation of the two has resulted in some success in Illinois. It must be realized
that there are unique advantages to both discretion and strictness, just as there
are disadvantages.
It might easily be thought that since Florida incorporates features from
both these systems it would prove successful. There are several factors which
have hindered the probability of success. First, is the inadequacy of the statutory
fees which compels the chancellor to make matters discretionary which need not
be so. There is a definite need for a revision of the Flprida statutes setting
the basic fees of masters in chancery. As constituted at present, the fees are
much too low to attract the caliber attorney so necessary to achieve a high level
of judicial administration. Those who serve on an ordinary reference are not
pro)erly compensated for their services if the statute is strictly observed:
Second. when discretion must be exercised, the supreme court has failed not
only to provide a discernible standard, but also has complicated matters by
vacillating in its holdings. The Supreme Court of Florida should, at the first
opportunity, establish definite rules to guide lower courts in the objective
exercise of their discretion. This step must be taken, because legislation can
not adequately cover the topic of discretion.
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